even at plantation sites. (27-28) He also notes negative reactions by blacks to such presentations, which they often experience as painful and disturbing. (29-30) The wisdom of preserving the memory of slavery has long been debated among black intellectuals, by Alexander Crummell and Frederick Douglass, for instance, as by Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois.
 Nathan Irwin Huggins, Black Odyssey, xliv. In using the terms “solidarity” and “community,” I am not signaling a communitarian line on political integration. Rather, I am referring broadly to the “political imaginary” that defines individuals’ and groups’ sense of belonging to a larger political community; and I am arguing that only insofar as whites and blacks imagine themselves to be integral parts of the same political community will the task of taking collective action on common goals related to the legacy of slavery be amenable to democratic resolutions.
 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech (New York: Routledge, 1997), 89. See also, Patricia J. Williams. “Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,” in R. Delgado & J. Stefancic, ed., Critical Race Theory (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 80-90.
 As Dilip Gaonkar has remarked in conversation, this tension presents peculiar problems for those contemporary “model minorities” who, unlike earlier European immigrants, get reracialized not as white but as “Asian-American,” thus marking another dimension of the American racial topography. The price of their higher standing in some spheres (e.g. education, employment) is their marginalization in others (e.g. politics, culture). For such minorities, understanding America’s racialized past would seem to be particularly important to comprehending and transforming their own situation. See, for instance, Claire Jean Kim, Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-Korean Conflict in New York City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
 See Habermas, “Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State,” and Robert Gooding-Williams, “Race, Multiculturalism, and Democracy,” Constellations 5 (1998): 18-41.
 On the nature and sources of “deliberative inequalities,” see James Bohman, Public Deliberation (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996), chap. 3, and James Bohman, “Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilities, Resources, and Opportunities,” in J. Bohman and W. Rehg, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997), 321-348.
 Cf. notes 46, 49, and 57 below.
 Donald R. Kinder & Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 11. I draw on empirical material provided by Kinder and Sanders in the analysis of racial politics that follows. For a broader survey of views on the role of race in American politics, see the collection Racialized Politics: the Debate about Racism in America, ed. D.O. Sears, J. Sidanius, and L. Bobo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
 “On equal opportunity in employment, school desegregation, federal assistance, affirmative action at work, and quotas in college admissions, racially resentful whites line up on one side of the issue, and racially sympathetic whites line up on the other. Racial resentment is not the only thing that matters, but by a fair margin racial resentment is the most important.” (Kinder and Sanders, 124, emphasis in original.) For an alternative view that places perceived group positions and interests at the center of the politics of race, see Lawrence Bobo, “Racial Beliefs about Affirmative Action: Assessing the Effects of Interests, Group Threat, Ideology, and Racism,” in Racialized Politics, 137-164. For another version of the social-structural approach that stresses the role of race in social stratification hierarchies, see Jim Sidanius & Felicia Pratto, Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Admittedly, to the extent that the politics of race is driven by the protection of group interests or the maintenance of social dominance, it would be less susceptible to amelioration by a politics of memory; beliefs in racial superiority/inferiority would be secondary factors — ideological justifications for existing